Acts Worse than Terrorism

Josh Rogin made me fairly depressed, that this bhTV forums debate was only a unwitting reprise of Casey vs. Lieberman on the Ft. Hood Massacre. Until that is, I read this brilliant Marc Lynch essay on combating the inclination to turn the “Clash of Civilizations’ fixation into self-fulfilling prophecy:

Since the Ft Hood atrocity, I’ve seen a meme going around that it somehow exposed a contradiction between “political correctness” and “security.” The avoidance of Nidal Hassan’s religion out of fear of offending anyone, goes the argument, created the conditions which allowed him to go undetected and unsanctioned in the months and years leading up to his rampage. American security, therefore, demands dropping the “political correctness” of avoiding a confrontation with Islamist ideas and asking the “tough questions” about Islam as a religion and the loyalty of Muslim-Americans. 

This framing of the issue is almost 100% wrong. There is a connection between what these critics are calling “political correctness” and national security, but it runs in the opposite direction. The real linkage is that there is a strong security imperative to prevent the consolidation of a narrative in which America is engaged in a clash of civilizations with Islam, and instead to nurture a narrative in which al-Qaeda and its affiliates represent a marginal fringe to be jointly combatted. Fortunately, American leaders — from the Obama administration through General George Casey and top counter-terrorism officials — understand this and have been acting appropriately.

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A lot of people — some well-meaning, some clowns or worse — evidently want the American response to the Ft. Hood shootings to revive the post-9/11 “war of ideas” and “clash of civilizations” anti-Islamic discourse. It’s a jihad, they shout, demanding careful scrutiny of the loyalty of American Muslims. That’s what they seem to mean by the demand to throw away “political correctness” and confront the ideological menace. The overall effect of their recommendations, however, would be to revive the flagging al-Qaeda brand and to greatly strengthen the appeal of its narrative. And that’s exactly what we should not want.

I don’t think it’s going to happen. President Obama and his national security team clearly rejects such strategic misconceptions. They understand the importance of combining effective police work and international cooperation with a carefully calibrated rhetoric and strategic communications campaign. Americans have learned a lot since 9/11. And if the careful police work and investigation uncovers real ties to al-Qaeda, then I expect they will pursue those leads and carry out the appropriate response quietly and efficiently — but without inflaming public hostilities, scoring cheap political points, or fueling the al-Qaeda narrative.

I’m second-to-none in my contempt for Huntington’s thesis, which is bad geopolitics and simplistic culturally. I have no doubt Hasan committed a terrorist act, but I’m more concerned about integrating Muslims in American life than enabling Gefense dependents, neo-cons with visions of a free buffet in Eurasia, and paleo-cons with lily-white memories to fight World War Four in Central Asia. Peter Beinart and Christopher Preble make a complementary point about Americans not losing their heads on the home front.